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Note 
 
Insufficient Government Protection: The 
Inescapable Element in Domestic Violence 
Asylum Cases 
Elsa M. Bullard∗ 
After years of abuse including beatings, the burning of her 
bed while she slept, and rape at gunpoint, a Mexican woman 
identified as L.R. sought refuge in the United States.1 L.R. re-
quested assistance from police in her small Mexican village on 
several occasions, but due to her common-law husband’s clout 
in the community, her attempts for protection failed.2 She suf-
fered abuse until her tormentor left with the couple’s three 
small children.3 L.R. eventually won custody and a protection 
order through the Mexican court system, and in the midst of 
continued threats to her and her family, L.R. departed with her 
children to the United States.4  
In April 2009 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
indicated that the Obama Administration may be open to alter-
ing or defining the United States’ policy for victims of domestic 
violence applying for asylum.5 In a supplemental brief opposing 
asylum to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in L.R’s 
case, the DHS suggested two acceptable formulations of a key 
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 1. Amended Declaration of L.R. in Support of Application for Asylum at 7–
9, L.R. v. United States (B.I.A. Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Declaration of L.R.], 
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum 
-support.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 9. 
 3. Id. at 13. 
 4. Id. at 18. 
 5. See Julia Preston, New Policy Permits Asylum for Battered Women, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 13548496. 
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asylum eligibility element, persecution on account of a “particu-
lar social group,” and recommended remand of the case, but did 
not discuss the government’s inability to protect the victim in 
detail.6 The severity of L.R.’s abuse and the large amount of 
supporting country-condition information proving the preva-
lence of domestic abuse in rural Mexico led the DHS attorney to 
stipulate to asylum in L.R.’s case.7 In August 2010 an immigra-
tion judge granted L.R. asylum in a short unpublished opinion.8 
Even with a clear definition of an acceptable “social group,” 
demonstrating that the Mexican government is unable or un-
willing to protect a domestic violence victim poses another sig-
nificant hurdle to meeting the requirements for asylum eligibil-
ity under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).9 In the future, the pivotal 
element for domestic violence asylum applicants may be dem-
onstrating that their home country governments are unable or 
unwilling to protect them from their persecutors.10 
The definition of “refugee” lays out the elements for asylum 
eligibility.11 These elements require that an applicant be “una-
ble or unwilling to return to . . . [or] avail himself or herself of 
the protection of” his or her native country due to “persecution 
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”12 Membership in a “particular social group” 
offers the only applicable category for a domestic violence situa-
tion.13 In its supplemental brief for L.R.’s case, DHS lawyers 
 
 6. Supplemental Brief of the Department of Homeland Security at 14, 
L.R. v. United States (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief in 
L.R.], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716 
-asylum-brief.pdf (recommending the particular social group be defined as ei-
ther “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or 
“Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their position within 
a domestic relationship”). 
 7. See Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting 
Standard on Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A14, available at 
2010 WLNR 16141188. 
 8. Matter of L.R., CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs 
.uchastings.edu/campaigns/Matter%20of%20LR.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). 
 9. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 27 (noting the requi-
site factor of proving that “Mexican authorities were unwilling or unable to 
protect” the asylum seeker). 
 10. See id. at 21–22.  
 11. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Laura S. Adams, Beyond Gender: State Failure to Protect Domestic 
Violence Victims as a Basis for Granting Refugee Status, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 239, 242 (2002). 
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recognized that the “unable or unwilling” government element 
may be the most difficult element to prove for future domestic 
violence victims seeking asylum.14 They neglected, however, to 
suggest a test or threshold requirement for this element, in-
stead leaving it to the review and discretion of the asylum offic-
ers.15 
After years of focus on defining a particular social group for 
domestic violence asylum applicants, DHS statements in In re 
L.R. and In re R-A- remove the issue from the center of these 
asylum claims.16 That does not mean applications based on 
domestic violence will sail through the immigration system. 
The examples of the United Kingdom and Canadian courts in-
dicate that decisionmakers’ focus will shift to the ability and 
willingness of governments to protect domestic violence vic-
tims.17 Examining decisions in the United Kingdom and Cana-
da is instructive as both countries, like the United States, ad-
here to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees.18 The United Kingdom and Canada expanded the 
definition of particular social group to include gender-based 
applicants several years ago.19 The examples of the United 
 
 14. Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 21–22. 
 15. See id.  
 16. See Department of Homeland Security Response to the Respondent’s 
Supplemental Filing of August 18, 2009, Alvarado-Pena (Exec. Office for Im-
migration Review Oct. 28, 2009) (No. A073 753 922) [hereinafter DHS Re-
sponse in Alvarado-Pena], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/ 
pdf/national/20091030asylum_brief.pdf (granting asylum as a matter of dis-
cretion); Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 14; see also Preston, su-
pra note 7, at A14 (discussing the final outcome in In re L.R.). 
 17. See infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text (discussing an altered 
focus in cases in the United Kingdom and Canada after the acceptance of do-
mestic violence victims as an eligible social group). 
 18. The United Nations Convention defines a refugee as a person with a 
“well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion . . . [who is] unable 
or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of 
each of those [countries of nationality or habitual residence].” See Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 150; see 
also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (adopting a nearly identical definition as 
that of the United Nations Convention); Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.) (defining a refugee as a person with a “well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group or political opinion . . . who [are] unable or, by 
reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of 
those [countries of nationality or habitual residence]”). 
 19. See Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, para. 78 (Can.) (finding asy-
lum possible for “individuals fearing persecution on such bases as gender”); Ex 
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Kingdom and Canada indicate a shift in focus to the availabili-
ty of state protection for domestic violence victims and away 
from the definition of particular social group.20 An unwilling 
and unable government is likely to become an ever-more impor-
tant element for asylum applicants to argue in future applica-
tions for asylum in the United States as well.21 
Although discretion is important in asylum to ensure con-
sideration of the facts of each individual applicant’s situation, 
asylum officers should apply discretion within a regulatory 
framework in order to provide some consistency between cas-
es.22 This Note examines thresholds set in the past to establish 
a government’s inability or unwillingness to protect its citizens, 
and continues by suggesting factors the Obama Administration 
should incorporate into any new asylum policies regarding do-
mestic violence applicants. Part I explains the development and 
current state of asylum law as it relates to victims of domestic 
violence, focusing on the governmental protection element. Part 
II examines case law interpretations indicating the central im-
portance of the governmental protection element, describes 
challenges facing domestic violence asylum applicants, and 
analyzes various approaches to the element of government pro-
tection. In Part III, this Note suggests a standard and accom-
panying factors for determining whether an applicant’s country 
is unable or unwilling to protect the applicant from domestic 
violence. This Note argues that in addition to defining accepta-
ble social groups, DHS should outline the threshold require-
ments to prove an applicant’s home country government is un-
able or unwilling to protect the applicant from an abuser. 
I.  GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS: HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF ASYLUM LAW   
In order to appreciate the challenges domestic violence vic-
tims face seeking asylum in the United States, scholars, practi-
tioners, and advocates must understand the overall legal 
framework of asylum. This Part first explains asylum law in 
 
parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [647] (appeal taken from Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.). 
 20. See infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 21–22. 
 22. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) (offering statistical data on asy-
lum officer decisions over more than a four-year time period to demonstrate 
and denounce the inconsistency in the officers’ discretionary grants of asylum). 
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the United States, then discusses the history of gender-based 
asylum law, and finally examines the development of asylum 
law in the area of domestic violence. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
For successful applicants, asylum provides protection with-
in the United States, an opportunity for employment,23 and the 
chance to bring family members to the United States.24 This 
section focuses on the statutory requirements,25 which many 
applicants struggle to overcome in order to receive a discretion-
ary grant of asylum.26  
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees forms the basis for U.S. asylum law.27 To re-
ceive asylum, an applicant must meet the definition of refu-
gee28 and must not be barred for any other statutory reason.29 
The burden of proof lies solely with the applicant to demon-
strate that these statutory requirements are met.30 A refugee is 
defined as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality 
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any coun-
try in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .31 
In order to satisfy the definition, an applicant must dem-
onstrate that her well-founded fear of persecution, from which 
her government is unwilling or unable to provide protection, is 
“on account of” her membership in one of the five protected cat-
egories.32  
 
 23. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B). 
 24. Id. § 1158(b)(3)(A). 
 25. Id. § 1158(b)(1). 
 26. See, e.g., Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–68 (B.I.A. 1996) 
(finding credibility easily, but engaging in an in-depth analysis as to the eligi-
bility requirements). 
 27. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 18, 
at 150. 
 28. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A). 
 29. See id. § 1158 (b)(2)(A) (listing examples of other statutory bars in-
cluding filing outside of the one-year deadline, aggravated felony convictions, 
being firmly resettled in another country, and persecuting others based on a 
protected ground). 
 30. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 31. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 32. Id.  
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The applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution can be 
based on either past persecution or a well-founded fear of fu-
ture persecution.33 A finding of past persecution creates a pre-
sumption of future persecution.34 The government can rebut 
this presumption by showing either a change in conditions such 
that a well-founded fear is no longer reasonable or demonstrate 
that reasonable relocation within the country of origin ends a 
fear of persecution.35 A change in conditions includes changes 
in either the applicant’s situation or the country’s conditions.36 
For example, a woman who filed an asylum application under 
the protected grounds of religion, but who has since converted 
to a different sect accepted within her country of origin, would 
no longer qualify for the presumption based on past persecu-
tion.37 The reasonableness of relocation depends on considera-
tion of several factors offered in the regulation.38  
A well-founded fear of future persecution must be both ob-
jectively and subjectively reasonable.39 If a reasonable person 
in the applicant’s situation would fear persecution if made to 
return to the applicant’s country of origin, a court would find 
that that fear is objectively reasonable.40 The applicant’s fear 
must be subjectively reasonable as demonstrated by her credi-
ble testimony.41 When the persecutor is an individual or group 
separate from the government, the applicant has to demon-
 
 33. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2010).  
 34. Id. § 208.13(b)(1). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Case law regarding changed conditions varies somewhat among cir-
cuit courts. Compare Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that when changed circumstances “evidently prevail” in a country, an 
immigration judge need not make specific findings of these changes in the 
record), and Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(basing a finding of changed country conditions on State Department and hu-
man rights reports), with Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (stating that when past persecution has been established, a State 
Department report alone is not sufficient to demonstrate changed country 
conditions). This Note merely provides a general description of law in this area. 
 38. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). In determining the reasonableness of re-
location an adjudicator should consider “whether the applicant would face oth-
er serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife 
within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geo-
graphical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, 
health, and social and familial ties.” Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Hassan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 40. See, e.g., Miranda v. INS, 139 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 41. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). 
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strate that she is unable or unwilling to avail herself of her 
government’s protection.42 
In order to demonstrate that persecution is “on account of” 
one of the protected grounds, the applicant must first establish 
membership in one of the protected classes.43 Of the five pro-
tected classes—race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, and political opinion—the particular 
social group is the most controversial and the grounds under 
which many domestic violence victims file for asylum.44 People 
who share an immutable characteristic, or some characteristic 
so fundamental that a person should not be asked to alter it, 
form a particular social group.45 The group cannot be defined, 
however, by the persecution itself.46 Once the applicant estab-
lishes that one of the protected classes applies to her, she must 
demonstrate that her persecution was “on account of” the pro-
tected ground.47 An applicant must satisfy all elements in the 
definition of “refugee” in order to be eligible for asylum.48 The 
next section discusses specific interpretations of this statutory 
language as it relates to gender.  
B. THE HISTORY OF GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS 
Women seeking asylum based on a gender-related49 issue 
face significant obstacles. First, gender violence is often not 
 
 42. See Adams, supra note 13, at 242 (outlining the current state of asy-
lum law in regard to nongovernmental persecutors). 
 43. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
 44. See Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Unable or 
Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qual-
ify as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 
742 (1997) (explaining the difficulty of separating the social-group definition 
from the political-opinion definition for victims of domestic violence). 
 45. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985) (defining an “immutable characteristic” as one that 
is “beyond the power of the individual members of the group to change or is so 
fundamental to their identities or consciences that it ought not be required to 
be changed”). 
 46. See Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] social 
group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution.”). 
 47. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Victims of Gender 
Violence: An Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Unpublished Deci-
sions, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Dec. 2003, at 1, 1 (defining “gender asylum” as 
when “(1) the feared harm is gender-specific or disproportionately impacts 
women, and/or (2) the reason (i.e., nexus) the harm is imposed is related to, or 
‘on account of ’ gender”). 
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viewed as persecution when the applicant’s society accepts or 
requires the behavior (as in the case of female genital mutila-
tion (FGM)).50 Second, violence against women is often commit-
ted by private actors and not the government.51 Third, gender 
is not one of the five protected grounds in the definition of refu-
gee.52 Gender-specific human rights cases frequently involve 
rape, FGM,53 or domestic violence.54 This section looks at the 
chronological development of international and U.S. asylum 
law on gender-based claims. 
International humanitarian law first addressed violence 
against women as a human rights issue in the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wom-
en, which was intended to further the human rights of women 
around the globe.55 The early 1990s brought the promulgation 
of various sets of guidelines regarding women’s gender-based 
asylum claims. In 1991, the United Nations High Commission-
er for Refugees (UNHCR) issued guidelines stating that gender 
may serve as grounds for asylum.56 Canada57 and the United 
States led with similar guidelines in 1993 and 1995, respective-
 
 50. See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asy-
lum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 777, 781–82 (2003). 
 51. See id. at 782. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Female genital mutilation is a cultural practice of removing all or a 
portion of a woman’s external genitalia, usually with rudimentary instru-
ments and without anesthesia. Female Genital Mutilation, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Feb. 2010), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/. The pro-
cedure is classified into four types ranging from merely pricking the genitals to 
complete removal and narrowing of the vaginal opening. Id. FGM is performed 
throughout the world, but predominantly in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, 
usually between infancy and age fifteen. Id. 
 54. See Musalo, supra note 50, at 782. 
 55. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; see also Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 
(Feb. 23, 1994) (strengthening protections for women). 
 56. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of 
Refugee Women, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (July 22, 1991). 
 57. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS 
FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION: GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE 
CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT (1996) 
[hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES], available at http://www.irb.gc.ca/eng/ 
brdcom/references/pol/guidir/Pages/women.aspx. 
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ly.58 Several other countries followed, including the United 
Kingdom in 2000.59 The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) Guidelines, promulgated in the United States, do not 
dictate the decisions of immigration judges or asylum officers, 
but they form part of the asylum officers’ required reading.60 
These guidelines created optimism that women seeking asylum 
on gender-based claims could look ahead to increased success.61 
In practice, however, the jurisprudence following the guidelines 
indicated that many obstacles continued to exist for gender-
based asylum applicants.62 
Early gender-based cases relied on various aspects of asy-
lum law. Mostly unsuccessfully, applicants pled that their gov-
ernments could not protect them, or they pled persecution on 
account of religion or political opinion.63 In an early deporta-
tion-withholding case involving a gender-based claim, In re 
Pierre, the Haitian applicant experienced violence at the hands 
of her husband who served in a position equivalent to a senator 
in the United States.64 She failed to plead membership in one of 
the five protected groups and instead relied on her husband’s 
high position, arguing it foreclosed any protection for her from 
the Haitian government.65 The court dismissed the case based 
on her failure to demonstrate how her persecution at the hands 
of her husband was “on account of” one of the protected 
grounds, and because she failed to present evidence showing 
that the government could or would not protect her, stating 
“[n]ot every unlawful act of individual harassment will amount 
to persecution.”66 The court recognized that persecution could 
 
 58. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Internal Affairs, to all INS 
Asylum Office/rs (May 26, 1995), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
documents/legal/guidelines_us.pdf. 
 59. IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTH., ASYLUM GENDER GUIDELINES (2000) 
[hereinafter U.K. GUIDELINES], available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
documents/legal/gender_guidelines/UK_guidelines.pdf. 
 60. See Patricia A. Seith, Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a 
Means of Protection for Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1804, 1830 (1997). 
 61. See Deborah E. Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer?, 32 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 771, 778 (1995) (describing the INS guidelines as opening 
“the possibility of a new era for women refugees”).  
 62. See Mark von Sternberg, Outline of United States Asylum Law: Sub-
stantive Criteria and Procedural Concerns, in DEFENDING IMMIGRATION 
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 2009, at 39, 68 (PLI N.Y. Practice Skills, Course Hand-
book Ser. No. 21,451, 2009). 
 63. See Anker et al., supra note 44, at 741–44.  
 64. Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 461–62 (B.I.A. 1975). 
 65. Id. at 462. 
 66. Id. at 463. 
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occur at the hands of a nongovernmental actor for the purposes 
of asylum, but set a high evidentiary threshold.67 This case set 
the stage for the focus in later gender-based asylum cases on 
defining a particular social group.  
In re Fauziya Kasinga, decided in 1996, was the first case 
that resulted in a woman gaining asylum based on a gender-
defined social group.68 In Kasinga, the seventeen-year-old ap-
plicant feared that she would be forced to undergo FGM in her 
native Togo.69 The court found persecution on account of her 
membership in the particular social group defined as “young 
women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had 
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the prac-
tice.”70 Since Kasinga, courts have found broader gender-based 
particular social groups acceptable such as “Somali females.”71 
Most gender-based asylum cases focus on defining the particu-
lar social group and demonstrating that the persecution is on 
account of that group.72 Generally, in FGM cases, courts have 
found government protection unavailable where there are no 
laws prohibiting the practice, where FGM is viewed as en-
grained in the culture, and where the practice is prevalent 
within the applicant’s country.73  
The development of gender-based asylum law focused on 
the definition of a particular social group. As the next section 
discusses, the acceptance of gender as a way to define a par-
ticular social group in FGM cases, however, did not immediate-
 
 67. See id. at 462 (citations omitted).  
 68. Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 69. Id. at 358. 
 70. Id. at 365. 
 71. See, e.g., Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 515, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that in Somalia, where ninety-eight percent of the female population 
undergoes FGM, a well-founded fear of persecution is reasonable for any So-
mali woman).  
 72. See Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The Asylum 
Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1199, 1250–61 (2009) (focusing on the need for regulation, but only discussing 
that need in reference to the particular social group and nexus requirements). 
But see Adams, supra note 13, at 240 (arguing that commentators have spent 
too much time focusing on gender groups and not enough on the state’s action 
or lack of action). 
 73. See, e.g., Hassan, 484 F.3d at 515, 518 (using State Department re-
ports to establish the prevalence of FGM at ninety-eight percent of women); 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 362 (relying on reports from the State Department 
establishing the widespread practice of FGM in Togo and the general accep-
tance of the procedure). 
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ly extend to women whose claims were based on domestic vi-
olence.  
C. DEVELOPMENT OF ASYLUM LAW FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
VICTIMS IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
There is no binding U.S. precedent granting asylum to a 
domestic violence claimant.74 Recent decisions, however, offer 
greater hope to domestic violence applicants.75 Moreover, indi-
vidual asylum officers and immigration judges have permitted 
asylum under domestic violence conditions in some cases.76 
Canada and the United Kingdom have more clearly defined 
case law on domestic violence asylum than the United States.77 
The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees governs the United States, Canada, and the United King-
dom, thereby making a comparison of foreign case law relevant 
to U.S. asylum law.78 Thus, this section will discuss U.S. as 
well as Canadian and British case law developments in the 
area of domestic violence asylum law. 
The United States defines domestic violence as a violent 
crime where the victim is the “spouse, former spouse, intimate 
partner, former intimate partner, child, or former child . . . or 
any other relative” of the perpetrator.79 This Note focuses only 
on female domestic violence victims whose persecutor is a male 
 
 74. See von Sternberg, supra note 62, at 68 (“No circuit or Board decision 
has articulated application of the statutory standard in [the domestic violence] 
setting.”); Matter of L.R., CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, supra 
note 8 (explaining that the BIA decision in L.R. is not binding on courts but 
only on asylum officers). 
 75. See, e.g., Paul Elias, Domestic Violence Victim Granted Asylum in US, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/ 
photos%20%20Domestic%20Violence%20Victim%20Granted%20Asylum%20In% 
20US%20_%20NPR.pdf; Preston, supra note 7, at A14. 
 76. Musalo & Knight, supra note 49, at 1 (conducting a survey of forty-five 
unpublished decisions of immigration judges showing many cases where asy-
lum was granted). 
 77. Musalo, supra note 50, at 777–78 (noting that unlike in the United 
Kingdom, the jurisprudence in the United States has been contradictory); cf. 
Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into 
Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 145 
n.133 (2009) (noting that there have been more successful gender-based claims 
in Canada than the United States). 
 78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (defining refugee status); Immi-
gration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.) (same); see also 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 18, at 150.  
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2006). 
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intimate partner, because this is the most prevalent type of 
domestic violence.80 Although same-sex and female-on-male 
domestic abuse occurs, these applicants face additional chal-
lenges in seeking asylum requiring more in-depth discussion 
than can be provided here.81 
The key U.S. domestic abuse asylum case, In re R-A-, in-
volved a Guatemalan woman seeking asylum after suffering 
ten years of severe and repeated abuse by her husband before 
she finally fled the country.82 In that decision, Attorney Gener-
al Reno vacated the BIA’s denial of asylum.83 She remanded 
and stayed the case for reconsideration after the approval of a 
proposed set of federal rules to be issued by the INS.84 The 
agency never issued the rules, and In re R-A- continued under 
the stay for seven years until Attorney General Mukasey or-
dered the case remanded to the BIA for decision.85 Due to the 
stay and failure to enact the proposed federal rules, a backlog 
of cases involving gender-based social groups developed, and 
the Attorney General remanded the case in an attempt to force 
the BIA to solidify the law in domestic violence asylum 
claims.86 The BIA remanded to the immigration judge, and on 
October 28, 2009, DHS argued that the applicant qualified for 
asylum under the statute.87 An immigration judge granted asy-
 
 80. See SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf. 
 81. See Nicole LaViolette, Gender-Related Refugee Claims: Expanding the 
Scope of the Canadian Guidelines, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 169, 204 (2007) (dis-
cussing the difficulties men experience when claiming asylum based on do-
mestic violence under the Canadian Guidelines); Fatma E. Marouf, The 
Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social 
Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orienta-
tion and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 86 (2008) (describing some of 
the challenges faced by lesbians seeking asylum based on the lack of social vis-
ibility of sexual orientation in many cultures). 
 82. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908–09 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 83. Id. at 906. 
 84. Id. The proposed rule would have provided guidance for gender-based 
claims, including incorporating language from the UNHCR handbook regard-
ing the court’s determination of when a government is unable or unwilling to 
protect a victim. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 
76,591 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). The court 
would have to consider “whether the government takes reasonable steps to 
control the infliction of harm or suffering and whether the applicant has rea-
sonable access to the state protection that exists.” Id. 
 85. R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 630–32 (A.G. 2008). 
 86. Id. at 630. 
 87. DHS Response in Alvarado-Pena, supra note 16. 
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lum on December 16, 2009, ending the most publicized domes-
tic violence asylum case favorably for the applicant and poten-
tially paving the way for others.88 The focus in U.S. domestic 
violence asylum cases up to this point has been on the appli-
cant’s particular social group. 
In other countries, courts move beyond discussion of a do-
mestic violence applicant’s particular social group to examine 
the government’s role in the alleged persecution. Some foreign 
courts have used a “bifurcated approach,” where the legal 
theory acknowledges that an applicant’s persecutor is an indi-
vidual not abusing her based on her particular social group, but 
rather that the government fails to protect her based on a 
gender-defined social group.89 Great Britain’s House of Lords 
introduced this approach in Ex parte Shah where the court 
granted asylum to Pakistani victims of domestic violence.90 The 
Lords found the appropriate test to be “Persecution = Serious 
Harm + The Failure of State Protection,” where the state’s fail-
ure to protect could serve as the nexus to the particular social 
group rather than the individual abuser.91 This approach re-
sulted in successful claims in other foreign courts as well.92 In 
the United States, however, the BIA rejected the use of a bifur-
cated approach in the appeal of In re R-A-, and instead empha-
sized that the nexus must be between the actual persecutor and 
the particular social group.93 Although the Attorney General 
vacated the earlier decision in In re R-A-, no U.S. court has ex-
plicitly adopted the bifurcated approach.94  
 
 88. Elias, supra note 75; Julia Preston, Officials Endorse Asylum for 
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, at A14, available at 2009 WLNR 21654842. 
 89. Musalo, supra note 50, at 788. 
 90. Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [647] (appeal taken from Im-
migration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.). 
 91. Id. at 653. 
 92. See, e.g., Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Khawar 
[2002] HCA 14, ¶ 33 (Austl.) (demonstrating how an Australian court used a 
bifurcated analysis to find asylum appropriate for a Pakistani domestic vi-
olence victim); REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS AUTHORITY: NEW ZEALAND, REFUGEE 
APPEAL NO. 76512 (2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/ 
4c3adf5b2.pdf (adopting the House of Lords test from Ex parte Shah to grant 
asylum to a victim of domestic violence from Iran). 
 93. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 922 (B.I.A. 2001) (“But governmental inac-
tion is not a reliable indicator of the motivations behind the actions of private 
parties. And this is not a case in which it has been shown that the Government 
of Guatemala encourages its male citizens to abuse its female citizens . . . .”). 
 94. See Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence 
Abroad: United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 108–11 (2004); cf. Karen 
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In the United Kingdom, Ex parte Shah remains the con-
trolling case on domestic violence asylum.95 Subsequent cases 
followed the Ex parte Shah model, holding that “domestic vi-
olence, if coupled with a lack of state protection that is discrim-
inatory, is capable of constituting persecution.”96 Since Ex parte 
Shah, many cases on appeal have centered on relocation in the 
applicant’s home country.97 Analysis of relocation to a safer 
part of the applicant’s home country necessarily considers the 
government’s ability to better protect the applicant in a differ-
ent part of the country.98 The bifurcated analysis in Ex parte 
Shah makes the applicant’s burden of proving persecution on 
account of a particular social group fairly clear, thereby leaving 
difficult fact-specific questions surrounding the reasonableness 
of relocation.99 In British courts, the test for relocation is 
whether relocation would be unreasonable and unduly harsh.100 
In determining reasonableness, courts consider several factors 
from the Home Office in the context of human rights claims, in-
cluding the position of women in society, the education and lit-
 
Musalo, Claims for Protection Based on Religion or Belief, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE 
L. 165, 208 (2004) (stating, in relation to an asylum claim on religious 
grounds, that the bifurcated test has fared poorly in the United States). 
 95. See Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. at 653. 
 96. P v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1640,  
[31] (Eng.). 
 97. See, e.g., AB (Jamaica) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] 
EWCA (Civ) 784 (Eng.); CM (Cameroon) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2008] EWCA (Civ) 125 (Eng.); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 95 (Eng.); VNM v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2006] EWCA (Civ) 47 (Eng.). 
 98. See R (on the application of M) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2010] EWHC (Admin) 1560, [19] (Eng.) (considering the general conditions for 
women in Pakistan in regard to reasonable relocation); see also AA (Sudan), 
[2007] EWCA (Civ) at [13] (stating that based on the position of women in Pa-
kistani society relocation is not reasonable); RG (Ethiopia) v. Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 339, [41] (Eng.) (remanding for analysis 
on whether relocation would be safe). 
 99. See, e.g., AB (Jamaica), [2008] EWCA (Civ) at [6]; VNM, [2006] EWCA 
(Civ) at [15, 25] (considering whether expecting a domestic violence victim to 
relocate within Kenya and live the remainder of her life under a false story 
regarding her history and the paternity of her children was reasonable); R (on 
the application of Umar) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWHC 
(Admin) 2385, [4] (Eng.). 
 100. AB (Jamaica), [2008] EWCA (Civ) at [34]; Hamid v. Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dep’t, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1219, [32] (Eng.) (affirming the “unduly 
harsh” test for relocation in asylum claims). 
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eracy of women, and the woman’s economic self-sufficiency.101 
Thus, domestic violence asylum applicants in the United King-
dom still face evidentiary challenges centered on the govern-
ment’s ability to protect the applicant and reasonable reloca-
tion despite the expansive social group language in Ex parte 
Shah. 
The seminal case in Canada on the government protection 
element, Ward v. Canada, recognized gender as a basis for a 
particular social group, but emphasized that asylum is a sub-
stitute for the protection of an applicant’s country of origin.102 
The court found a presumption of state protection,103 which an 
applicant must rebut with “relevant, reliable and convincing 
evidence which satisfies the trier of fact on a balance of proba-
bilities that the state protection is inadequate.”104 Courts se-
lected “adequacy” over “effectiveness” as the test for state pro-
tection because “requiring effectiveness of other countries’ 
authorities would be to ask of them what our own country is 
not always able to provide.”105 Case law indicates that although 
100 percent effectiveness is not required, a state must demon-
strate more than “good intentions” regarding protection of do-
mestic violence victims.106 The Canadian appellate courts en-
couraged using multiple factors or pieces of evidence to make 
decisions about a government’s ability and willingness to pro-
tect an applicant.107 Although gender can form the basis of a 
particular social group in Canadian courts, asylum applicants 
still face difficult obstacles in demonstrating inadequacy of 
state protection. 
United States asylum law surrounding domestic violence 
victims may be moving closer to that of Canada and the United 
Kingdom with statements by DHS in its supplemental brief in 
 
 101. See Hamid, [2005] EWCA (Civ) at [2] (distinguishing these factors as 
relevant in human rights claims but not when considering relocation in asy-
lum cases); cf. AA (Sudan), [2007] EWCA (Civ) at [13]. 
 102. Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, paras. 25, 78 (Can.). 
 103. Id. at para. 59. 
 104. Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 30 (Can.). 
 105. Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, para. 11 (Can. F.C.) (WL). 
 106. Hooper v. Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, para. 30 (Can. F.C. ) (WL); 
see also Vidhani v. Canada, [1995] 3 F.C. 60, paras. 13–14 (Can.) (finding ade-
quate government protection in Kenya where there are laws prohibiting do-
mestic violence, advocacy groups are present, there are documented cases of 
recourse for victims of domestic violence, and the applicant failed to seek as-
sistance from the Kenyan government prior to applying for asylum relief ).  
 107. See, e.g., Hooper, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, paras. 19, 29; Mitchell v. 
Canada, 2006 CarswellNat 262, paras. 9–10 (Can. F.C.) (WL). 
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In re L.R.108 DHS stated that acceptable social groups for do-
mestic violence applicants include “[nationality] women in do-
mestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “[nationality] 
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions 
within a domestic relationship.”109 DHS recognized that remov-
ing the formation of the particular social group from the analy-
sis still leaves significant hurdles for applicants, especially in 
showing that a state is unable or unwilling to protect the appli-
cant and in showing the reasonableness of relocation.110 Since 
the positive decision for R-A-, courts have already begun to fo-
cus on the government’s role in the persecution. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has denied a Honduran domestic violence victim based on 
her inability to prove the government was unable and unwilling 
to protect her with no discussion of her social group.111 The re-
mainder of this Note examines these other obstacles that will 
most likely be the new focus of judicial analysis in domestic vi-
olence based asylum claims. 
II.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM TURNS ON A LACK 
OF GOVERNMENT PROTECTION   
Despite the focus in the past twenty years on fitting do-
mestic violence asylum applicants into a particular social group 
acceptable under U.S. asylum law, the element upon which asy-
lum hinges for most applicants will become the lack of govern-
ment protection. This element is likely to emerge in the fore-
front of the discussion on asylum now that DHS has made clear 
that the Obama Administration considers domestic violence 
grounds for asylum.112 This Part demonstrates that the gov-
ernment protection element, although less discussed, is the key 
to asylum and illustrates the problems applicants encounter in 
proving an “unable and unwilling government.” This Part also 
evaluates the INS proposed rule considered in 2000, the Cana-
dian Guidelines, and the U.K. Guidelines as potential models 
for future DHS guidelines. 
 
 108. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 14. 
 109. Id. at 14. 
 110. Id. at 21–22. 
 111. Maldonado-Chinchilla v. Holder, 388 F. App’x 598, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Maldonado-Chinchilla did not establish the abuse she suffered constituted 
persecution because she failed to show the government was unwilling or una-
ble to protect her from her boyfriend.”). 
 112. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 11 (indicating that 
DHS believes there are formulations of particular social groups that would 
make asylum permissible for domestic violence victims). 
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A. THE LURKING ELEMENT: AN UNABLE OR UNWILLING 
GOVERNMENT 
The United Kingdom and Canada created a path for do-
mestic violence applicants under the particular social group 
provisions in their statutes, but the result has not been a 
marked increase in domestic violence asylees.113 This lack of in-
creased asylum for domestic violence victims is due in part to 
the heavy emphasis the British and Canadian courts place on 
the governmental protection element. In cases where asylum 
was denied or the case was remanded, the courts’ decisions now 
often hinge on the governmental protection element.114 The 
practical example of the courts of the United Kingdom and 
Canada indicate that U.S. courts will also likely shift their em-
phasis to governmental protection now that DHS created room 
in the particular social group for domestic violence victims.115 
Even eliminating a requirement for persecution “on account of” 
one of the five statutory grounds entirely will not assist a do-
mestic violence asylum applicant in proving a lack of govern-
ment protection.116 The requirement that an applicant prove 
her government is unable or unwilling to offer protection from 
domestic violence quells fears that DHS’s acceptance of gender 
as grounds for a particular social group will open the floodgates 
 
 113. Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open, but Will the 
U.S. Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 53 (2006) (stating that other countries, 
including the United Kingdom, created a path to asylum despite the fear of a 
floodgates issue); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: 
Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
119, 133 (2007) (noting that Canadian statistics do not indicate a significant 
increase in gender-based asylum claims since the issuance of the Guidelines).  
 114. See, e.g., Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 36 (Can.) (de-
nying asylum where the applicant failed to establish inadequate state protec-
tion); Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, paras. 8–11 (Can. F.C.) (WL) 
(upholding a lower court decision denying asylum where the applicants did not 
demonstrate a lack of adequate government protection); AB (Jamaica) v. Sec’y 
of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 784, [34] (Eng.) (denying asy-
lum where the applicant failed to show that the government could not offer her 
protection anywhere in her country); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 95, [13] (Eng.) (remanding the case for the lower 
court to consider the lack of governmental protection throughout the country). 
 115. Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 21–22. 
 116. See Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn’t “Persecution” Enough? Redefining the 
Refugee Definition to Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-
Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 519, 558 (2009) 
(discussing two potential downsides to eliminating the five statutory grounds 
for asylum). 
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of asylum seekers.117 Indeed, applicants will continue to face 
obstacles in proving inadequate government protection, be-
cause their persecutors are individual actors. In asylum cases 
where U.S. courts accepted the proffered particular social 
group, such as honor killings and HIV positive applicants, prov-
ing the government is the persecutor or is at least unwilling to 
intervene has been the pivotal element.118 Although always 
present and discussed in a cursory manner, the element of gov-
ernment protection is likely to become the key to most domestic 
violence applicant’s claims in U.S. courts. 
B. THE CHALLENGES OF PROVING AN UNABLE OR UNWILLING 
GOVERNMENT 
An applicant faces many difficulties in proving that her 
government is unable or unwilling to protect her. Some of these 
difficulties arise from balancing a victim’s attempts to receive 
assistance with her hesitancy to take action, the private nature 
of domestic abuse, and the relative lack of power of the abuser 
as compared to the government. This section focuses on these 
three significant obstacles. 
Victims frequently hesitate in reporting violence due to 
embarrassment and fears that the violence will increase if their 
partner learns the victim reported the abuse.119 In countries 
where the cultural perception reflects a lack of governmental 
support to domestic violence victims, abused women are likely 
to refrain from reporting the abuse, assuming a report would be 
futile.120 Although courts recognize the potential obstacles to 
 
 117. See Musalo, supra note 113, at 133. But see The Abrams Report 
(MSNBC television broadcast Mar. 11, 2004) (hosting Pat Buchanan, who ar-
gued that domestic violence asylum seekers can go to Canada and should be 
kept out of the United States for fear of a floodgates problem).  
 118. Paredes v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 219 F. App’x 879, 884, 887 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(upholding the BIA and Immigration judge decisions regarding the HIV-
positive applicant’s failure to prove government involvement or support of his 
persecution); Yaylacicegi v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 33, 36 (7th Cir. 2006) (de-
nying asylum to a woman due to her failure to prove the government would 
not protect her from an honor killing). 
 119. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON WOMEN’S HEALTH 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 75–77 (2005) [hereinafter WHO 
STUDY], available at http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_ 
study/en/index.html. 
 120. Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [635–36] (appeal taken from 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.) (stating that reporting domestic abuse in 
Pakistan would be futile); WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at 87 (reporting fre-
quent responses of “‘nobody will believe me’ or ‘they will not be able to help’” to 
the question why not seek government services for domestic violence posed to 
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victims in reporting, most courts prefer a domestic violence asy-
lum applicant to have at least attempted to obtain state aid.121 
Although there is no official requirement that an applicant at-
tempt to utilize government assistance in her country of ori-
gin,122 she gains credibility in alleging unavailable government 
protection if she attempted to receive services to no avail.  
Domestic abuse, by its very name, occurs primarily in the 
home.123 In most countries, the home is a private sphere where 
governmental influence is muted.124 Due to this lack of gov-
ernment influence, the likelihood of the government discover-
ing domestic violence is very low unless the victim reports it.125 
Nongovernmental aid agencies confront difficulties in deter-
mining the scope of the domestic abuse problem in countries 
where there is little reporting.126 This expectation of privacy in 
the home exists in the United States, and it would be hypocriti-
cal for the United States to require governments of other coun-
tries to breach the privacy of their citizens to ensure protection 
from domestic violence when the home is given special consid-
eration in the United States.127 The United States combats the 
problem of private domestic violence through public education, 
the availability of victim support programs, and responsive law 
 
24,000 women from various countries in a study, thus “highlight[ing] the cred-
ibility gap of many services”). 
 121. See, e.g., Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 
2007) (requiring an attempt to obtain state aide absent exceptional circum-
stances); Kere v. Gonzales, 252 F. App’x 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring the 
asylum seeker to show the government either condoned or was helpless to pre-
vent the persecution); Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2005) (stating that government agents must either commit the persecution or 
be unwilling or unable to prevent it); Roman v. INS, 233 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (requiring that local government either condone or be unable to 
prevent persecution of the victim). 
 122. S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000) (“Although she did not 
request protection from the government, the evidence convinces us that even if 
the respondent had turned to the government for help, Moroccan authorities 
would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct.”); Asylum 
and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) (2006) (defining domestic abuse as a violent crime 
against spouses, children, or others who are likely to live in or frequently visit 
the home of the abuser). 
 124. See Musalo & Knight, supra note 49, at 2. 
 125. See WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at vii (noting that a lack of reporting 
makes it difficult to document “the magnitude of violence against women”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding a 
constitutional right to privacy in the marital home). 
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enforcement and courts.128 Even in the United States, however, 
there are areas of the country where these support programs do 
not function and women remain in abusive relationships.129 
This implies that it is unrealistic to expect a foreign govern-
ment to have a 100 percent success rate in protecting domestic 
violence victims.130 In many countries the private nature of 
domestic violence causes victims to feel embarrassment and 
risk cultural ostracization by reporting the abuse.131 Thus, the 
private nature of domestic violence crimes makes it difficult for 
an applicant to demonstrate a pattern of failure by her native 
country in responding to these crimes.132 
Lastly, applicants face problems in overcoming the com-
monsense notion that the government, with overwhelming 
power compared to an individual persecutor, should be able to 
control that persecutor. A domestic violence applicant’s argu-
ment that the government is unable to control her persecutor is 
much more challenging than that of an asylum applicant ar-
guing a militant faction or influential cultural or social group is 
uncontrolled by the government.133 Controlling a single indi-
vidual in a country where any type of law enforcement exists 
 
 128. See Laura Dugan et al., Do Domestic Violence Services Save Lives?, 
NIJ J., Nov. 2003, at 20, 21 (describing various domestic violence resources 
available to victims in the United States). 
 129. See Sofia Peralta & Henry F. Fradella, Variations in Suggestions for 
Improving the Justice Systems’ Response to Intimate Partner Violence Cases, 
44 CRIM. L. BULL. 442, 448 (2008) (noting several of the psychological reasons 
why victims of domestic violence remain in abusive relationships). 
 130. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (“[N]o government is 
able to guarantee the safety of each of its citizens at all times.”). 
 131. See WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at 75–77; see also CAROL BOHMER & 
AMY SHUMAN, REJECTING REFUGEES: POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 227 (2008) (discussing the “personal,” rather than “political,” nature 
of domestic violence); DAVID HOLLENBACH, REFUGEE RIGHTS: ETHICS, 
ADVOCACY, AND AFRICA 131 (2008) (stating that asylum adjudicators often 
view gender-specific persecution as “personal” or “cultural”). 
 132. See WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at 75–77. 
 133. See, e.g., Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044–46 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(granting asylum where the Ukrainian government was not able to control ul-
tra nationalists who persecuted Jews); Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (granting asylum where the government could not control ethnic-
Fijian attacks against Indo-Fijians); Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 362 
(B.I.A. 1996) (finding the government of Togo made no efforts to prevent the 
practice of FGM by tribal elder women); H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 345 (B.I.A. 
1996) (recognizing that there was no effective government protection in Soma-
lia amidst warring clans). 
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seems a reasonable expectation.134 Significant crime or strife 
would need to exist within a country to imagine a situation 
where law enforcement resources were entirely consumed such 
that a single individual could not be controlled.135 Country con-
dition reports136 alone will usually be insufficient to demon-
strate that a functioning government is incapable of controlling 
an individual.137 An applicant will need to supplement general 
country condition information with her own personal expe-
rience where it will be difficult to demonstrate law enforcement 
inability if she has not reported her abuse.138 
New DHS regulations should address these three chal-
lenges to domestic violence asylum applicants. The following 
sections assess potential tests and factors for inclusion in a 
standard for identifying an unable or unwilling government. 
C. A RULE PROPOSED AND NEVER ADOPTED 
The Department of Justice proposed a rule in 2000, but it 
was never enacted.139 The proposed rule addressed the element 
of government protection, suggesting a two-part inquiry to de-
termine a government’s inability or unwillingness to protect its 
citizens. First, a judge or asylum officer should look at whether 
the government took “reasonable steps to control the infliction 
 
 134. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 26 (stating that 
the applicant will have a difficult time demonstrating there is no government 
protection in Mexico where a functional police force and legal system exist 
from which the applicant did receive assistance). 
 135. See H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 345 (discussing how widespread, intraclan 
fighting placed many Somalis “beyond the rule and protection of recognized 
law and social order”). 
 136. Courts rely on country-condition reports by the State Department, 
humanitarian organizations, and other sources to corroborate or determine 
whether an applicant is likely to suffer persecution in her home country. See, 
e.g., Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 2009); Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. at 362. 
 137. Susan K. Kerns, Note, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asy-
lum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 197, 201 (2000) (“Evidence of generally oppressive conditions in the 
country of origin is by itself insufficient to show that the individual applicant 
is at particular risk on account of a protected characteristic or belief.”); Krish-
ma C. Parsad, Note, Illegal Renditions and Improper Treatment: An Obliga-
tion to Provide Refugee Remedies Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture, 
37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 681, 697 (2009) (noting that country-condition 
information produced by the State Department may not be accurate). 
 138. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 139. See id. at 76,588 (noting that the rule still retains its “proposed” status). 
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of harm or suffering.”140 Second, the court or asylum officer 
must determine if “the applicant has reasonable access to the 
state protection that exists.”141 The rule goes on to suggest evi-
dence that may support these inquiries, including government 
complicity toward the harm, attempts by the applicant to get 
government assistance, the government’s response, obligatory 
official action, a pattern of unresponsiveness, denial of services, 
general country conditions, government policies regarding the 
suffering, and prevention steps by the government.142 The pro-
posed rule in its 2000 formulation does not provide the kind of 
guidance or focus helpful to courts and practitioners. 
The proposed rule does not go far enough because it fails to 
clarify whether an applicant must show both that the govern-
ment has not taken reasonable steps to control the abuse and 
that she does not have reasonable access to protection. It is un-
clear if proof of just one of these elements would suffice to meet 
the applicant’s burden as to a lack of government protection. 
The comments to the rules indicate that an applicant’s failure 
to seek governmental protection is not dispositive of a state’s 
inability or unwillingness to protect the applicant.143 This im-
plies that the second prong of the test is more complex than 
merely showing an applicant did not report her abuse to the po-
lice and should therefore be denied asylum. This lack of clarity 
and focus results in an only moderately helpful framework, and 
since the proposed rule was never adopted, litigants and courts 
continue with insufficient guidance.  
D. CANADIAN AND U.K GUIDELINES 
Other countries address the problem of domestic violence 
asylum seekers by issuing guidelines for their immigration 
courts and applicants.144 Canada and the United Kingdom 
serve as examples of approaches by other countries with asy-
lum statutes similar to those of the United States.145 Although 
both Canada and the United Kingdom are viewed as more wel-
coming to domestic violence asylum applicants than the United 
 
 140. Id. at 76,591.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. These evidentiary factors come primarily from case law where the 
various factors were found persuasive or at least considered by a court hearing 
a gender-based asylum claim. See id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. See, e.g., CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57; U.K. GUIDELINES, su-
pra note 59. 
 145. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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States,146 they both maintain fairly rigid guidelines on the ele-
ment of government protection leading to case decisions cen-
tered on governmental protection.147  
The Canadian Guidelines allow for gender-based asylum 
claims despite the lack of gender as a protected category in the 
Canadian Immigration Act.148 They focus on the individual 
woman’s situation and spend time addressing the evidentiary 
problems associated with proving an unwilling or unable gov-
ernment.149 The guidelines require the applicant to prove it was 
“objectively unreasonable for her to seek the protection of her 
state.”150 In order to determine objective reasonableness, a 
court should consider social, cultural, religious, and economic 
factors influencing the applicant’s environment.151 The guide-
lines even suggest that being ostracized from one’s community 
due to reporting domestic violence may be a sufficient factor to 
show it is unreasonable for the applicant to seek government 
protection.152 They also recognize the scarcity of evidence of 
gender-related persecution, and, therefore, state that testimony 
of the applicant or women in similar situations may be all a 
court has to consider in making a decision.153  
On their face, the Canadian Guidelines appear to be more 
deferential to the individual than the proposed U.S. rule. The 
 
 146. See M. Beth Morales Singh, Note, To Rescue, Not Return: An Interna-
tional Human Rights Approach to Protecting Child Economic Migrants Seek-
ing Refuge in the United States, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 537–
38 (2008) (discussing how courts in Canada and the United Kingdom, among 
other countries, have “linked refugee law to international human rights law,” 
but how U.S. courts lag behind in this respect). 
 147. See Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, para. 11 (Can. F.C.) 
(WL); Hooper v. Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, para. 30 (Can. F.C.) (WL); 
AB (Jamaica) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 784 
(Eng.); CM (Cameroon) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA 
(Civ) 125 (Eng.); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] 
EWCA (Civ) 95 (Eng.). 
 148. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, pmbl. (“The definition of Con-
vention refugee in the Immigration Act does not include gender as an inde-
pendent enumerated ground for a well-founded fear of persecution warranting 
the recognition of Convention refugee status. . . . [I]t has been more widely 
recognized that gender-related persecution is a form of persecution which can 
and should be assessed by the Refugee Division panel hearing the claim.”). 
 149. See id. at C(2). 
 150. Id. The Guidelines explicitly differentiate between state protection 
and protection from a nongovernmental organization. Id. The Guidelines deem 
the availability of the latter to be irrelevant. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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standard of proof for the applicant in Canada, however, is clear 
and convincing evidence,154 and in practice, this has been a 
fairly difficult obstacle for applicants to overcome. For example, 
an applicant failed to meet her burden of proof that the gov-
ernment’s protection was inadequate where she only reported 
abuse to the police one time in four years and did not utilize 
any of the state human rights programs or seek legal re-
course.155 In another case, the court held that the applicant 
provided sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of state protec-
tion where an applicant reported her abuse to the police after 
two brutal beatings, her husband was released from arrest af-
ter only an hour detention, neighbors and friends also reported 
the abuse to the police with no subsequent law enforcement ac-
tion, and official reports on poor police response in the country 
existed.156 The premier Canadian case on persecution by non-
state actors stated that, other than states that are in complete 
breakdown, a state is presumed capable of protecting its citi-
zens.157 Thus, an applicant to Canada must overcome a fairly 
significant burden in order to demonstrate her country cannot 
offer protection. 
In the United Kingdom, the 2000 Asylum Gender Guide-
lines support a “practical standard” that examines actual prac-
tices and states that the protection must be “meaningful, ac-
cessible, effective, and available to a woman regardless of her 
culture and position.”158 The United Kingdom offers a nonex-
haustive list of possible ways a government could fail to provide 
protection: official legislation; legal provisions or lack of legal 
provisions; access to justice and police protection; police re-
sponse; reluctance or refusal to investigate, prosecute, or pun-
ish persecutors; and encouragement or toleration of social, reli-
gious, or customary practices and behavioral norms.159 These 
guidelines match the court’s reasoning in the Ex parte Shah 
case, where the House of Lords explained that the domestic vi-
olence suffered by the applicant in Pakistan would not be per-
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 30 (Can.). Additionally, 
the court stated that the burden of showing inadequate state protection will be 
harder to meet where the country from which an applicant is seeking asylum 
is a democracy. Id. para. 32. 
 156. Hooper v. Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, paras. 2–5, 20, 32 (Can. 
F.C.) (WL). 
 157. Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, para. 57 (Can.). 
 158. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.2–.3. 
 159. Id. at 2B.  
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secution if it occurred in the United Kingdom,160 because in the 
United Kingdom, state protection is available to the victim, the 
persecutor could be prosecuted, and the victim could obtain a 
restraining order.161 The analysis in the Ex parte Shah case fo-
cused on the individual applicant’s access to services rather 
than the government’s purported program.162 
Both the Canadian Guidelines and the U.K. Guidelines fo-
cus on the applicant’s access to government protection.163 This 
is seen as the factor that differentiates a country that is unable 
or unwilling to protect domestic violence victims from, for ex-
ample, the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom, 
where some women will be victims of domestic violence, but the 
abuse will not be considered persecution.164 In the case of do-
mestic violence, focusing the analysis on the availability of gov-
ernment protection in relation to the individual applicant’s cir-
cumstances is wise. The persecutor in a domestic violence 
situation is unique to the applicant; therefore, the applicant’s 
ability to access government protection rather than the mere 
existence of government systems should weigh more heavily in 
the analysis. Emphasis on the individual applicant’s access is 
further discussed in the following Part providing recommenda-
tions for DHS policy. 
III.  DHS SHOULD PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON THE 
GOVERNMENTAL PROTECTION ELEMENT OF ASYLUM   
Although scholars have not focused on the importance of 
proving an unable and unwilling government,165 practitioners 
and advocates should not ignore this element. As demonstrated 
in Part II, courts focus on availability of government protection. 
When the actual persecutor is an individual, proving an inabili-
ty or unwillingness of the government to protect the domestic 
violence victim is difficult. Practitioners would benefit from 
 
 160. Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [648] (appeal taken from Im-
migration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 653–54. 
 163. See Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, paras. 56–59 (Can.) (finding 
that state complicity is not a necessary component of persecution, and it must 
be reasonable for the individual to seek state protection); Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 
at 648 (noting that “[w]hat makes it persecution” is the state being “unwilling 
or unable to offer her any protection”). 
 164. See Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. at 648. 
 165. See Anker, supra note 61, at 778; Grant, supra note 113, at 53; Musa-
lo, supra note 94, at 208; Musalo, supra note 50, at 781–82. 
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guidance from DHS on this highly discretionary, fact-specific, 
and until now neglected element of asylum. This Part recom-
mends the test and factors DHS should encourage applicants to 
focus on in meeting their burden of proof in this area. 
A. THE TEST AND FACTORS TO APPLY TO DETERMINE AN 
UNWILLING OR UNABLE GOVERNMENT 
The Department of Justice and courts’ cursory treatment of 
this element will likely come to an end with the acceptance of a 
social group formulation for domestic violence victims. A test is 
needed to ensure uniform analysis of this now important ele-
ment. The single-prong test should be whether the domestic vi-
olence applicant has reasonable access to government protec-
tion. This simplifies the test suggested in the Department of 
Justice’s 2000 proposed rule,166 and factors should accompany 
this test to assist in its application. A combination of the pro-
posed U.S. rule, the Canadian and U.K. Guidelines’ emphasis 
on the individual applicant, and other factors found in Cana-
dian and U.K. case law provide a helpful guide to immigration 
judges, applicants, practitioners, and advocates. 
Of the two-part analysis suggested in the Department of 
Justice’s 2000 proposed rule,167 an ideal rule need only include 
the second prong. The second part of the inquiry, asking 
whether the particular applicant has reasonable access to state 
protection, is the type of individualized inquiry that is essential 
in domestic violence asylum cases.168 The first prong, inquiring 
about the reasonable steps taken by the government to control 
the harm,169 may be illustrative of the country’s general condi-
tion, but that should not suffice to determine availability of 
government protection to a particular victim. The government’s 
reasonable steps toward controlling the infliction of harm can 
 
 166. Cf. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (requiring a court to 
assess both a state’s efforts to control the infliction of domestic violence and 
also the individual applicant’s access to any such government protections). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929–30 (B.I.A. 2001) (Guendelsberger, 
Bd. Member, dissenting) (using the specific facts of R-A-’s situation to demon-
strate the inadequacy of her accessibility to government protection); Hooper v. 
Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, paras. 29–30 (Can. F.C.) (WL) (finding that 
even though a restraining order would have been available, it would have been 
ineffective in the applicant’s circumstances); CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra 
note 57, at C (“The central factor in such an assessment is, of course, the claim-
ant’s particular circumstances . . . .”). 
 169. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591. 
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be included as a factor but should not be determinative. For ex-
ample, a government could be taking steps to enforce domestic 
violence laws and these efforts may be effective in urban areas. 
An applicant from a rural area, with less police presence or cor-
rupt police and a tight-knit community, still may not have rea-
sonable access to government protection. An individual appli-
cant’s reasonable access to government protection should be the 
controlling question in this analysis.  
In determining reasonable access to government protec-
tion, courts should weigh several factors noted in the proposed 
rule, foreign guidelines, and case law. Drawing from all three 
sources of law provides a more complete list of potential factors 
for U.S. courts to consider. In order to assess the reasonable-
ness of an applicant’s access to government protection, a court 
should consider the following key factors: the government’s en-
couragement or toleration of social, religious, and customary 
practices, and behavioral norms;170 attempts by the applicant 
to get government assistance;171 police or government response 
to reports of domestic violence;172 reluctance or refusal to inves-
tigate, prosecute, or punish persecutors;173 status or position of 
the persecutor;174 general country conditions including the tes-
timony of similarly situated women;175 social, cultural, reli-
gious, and economic factors influencing the applicant’s envi-
ronment;176 the structure of the country’s legal system;177 
 
 170. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.9. 
 171. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591. 
 172. Id.; U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8. 
 173. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8. 
 174. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 2001) (using former military 
service by the persecutor to convince the court that complaining to the police 
would be futile); Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 3 (Can.) (ar-
guing that she could not escape her abuser because his brother was a federal 
judicial police officer); AB v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA 
(Civ) 784, [10] (Eng.) (finding the threat to the applicant was greater based on 
her persecutor’s position as a gang leader in Jamaica); Declaration of L.R., su-
pra note 1, at 4 (discussing persecutor’s position as a wealthy restaurant own-
er in the small Mexican village where applicant lived). 
 175. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591; 
CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at C(2). 
 176. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at C(2). Social factors can in-
clude the size of the applicant’s community and the status of the persecutor in 
that community. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 26 (stating 
that issues dealing with an applicant’s “particular social group” remain ger-
mane to the asylum-granting inquiry).  
 177. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8. 
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official government policies or legislation;178 and preventive ac-
tions taken by the government.179 Domestic violence applicants 
have different circumstances and there could be additional fac-
tors relevant in particular cases. 
Conversely, some other potential factors are irrelevant to 
the inquiry into whether an applicant’s government is able to 
provide adequate protection. For example, whether the victim 
of domestic violence could have sought protection with her ex-
tended family has nothing to do with the government’s respon-
sibility to offer reasonable protection.180 Parents who are capa-
ble of protecting their daughter from her abuser are valuable; 
however, a capable and supportive family should not relieve the 
government of its responsibility to protect victims of domestic 
violence. Similarly, the existence of nongovernmental organiza-
tions dealing with issues of domestic violence in the applicant’s 
country of origin does not excuse the government from account-
ability for protection of its citizens.181 Courts should only con-
sider factors relating to the applicant’s relationship to her 
state. 
B. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TEST TO THE CHALLENGES 
OF ASYLUM APPLICANTS 
The proposed test, with its focus on the individual appli-
cant’s relationship to her government, eliminates some of the 
evidentiary challenges a domestic violence asylum seeker faces. 
The three significant obstacles to demonstrating eligibility for 
asylum—the victim’s hesitancy to report, the private nature of 
domestic violence, and the government’s overwhelming power 
when compared to an individual persecutor—are all remedied 
by the proposed test and the suggested accompanying fac-
tors.182 
The proposed test accounts for a victim’s hesitancy to seek 
assistance. Since the burden of proof in asylum cases lies with 
the applicant,183 the above-suggested factors rely on demon-
 
 178. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591; U.K. 
GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8. 
 179. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591. 
 180. But see id. (noting that the presence or absence of family support may 
factor into the determination of whether an applicant has adequate access to 
government protections). 
 181. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at C(2). 
 182. See supra notes 119–38 and accompanying text. 
 183. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2010). 
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strating her own actions will be easier to prove than the factors 
that require explaining action or inaction on the part of the 
government or her abuser. For example, an applicant can cred-
ibly testify to the fact that she called the police and they did not 
respond. Her testimony, however, carries less weight when she 
claims the government does not respond to domestic violence 
claims generally, so she never attempted to receive assistance 
personally. The weighing of many factors in the suggested test 
dilutes the necessity for a domestic violence victim to report her 
abuse to the police. A failed attempt to receive government as-
sistance should not be a required element of an applicant’s 
claim.184 Case law suggests, however, that this is a very per-
suasive piece of evidence.185 The applicant’s burden becomes 
more challenging when the state was never given an opportuni-
ty to fail in its response to the harm.186 A court’s inclusion of 
the following factors in its analysis will help to combat the per-
ception that a victim hesitant to report does not deserve asy-
lum: the government’s encouragement or toleration of social, 
religious, and customary practices and behavioral norms; the 
social, cultural, religious, and economic factors influencing the 
applicant’s environment; the position and status of the persecu-
tor; and the effectiveness of a government’s preventative steps 
to curb domestic violence.187  
Given that domestic violence is generally a private form of 
persecution, a test focused on the individual victim’s expe-
riences is logical. The applicant’s credible testimony may pro-
 
 184. See Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [648] (appeal taken from 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.); Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 
Fed. Reg. at 76,591; see generally Sharon Donovan, Note, No Where to Run 
. . . No Where to Hide: Battered Women Seeking Asylum in the United States 
Find Protection Hard to Come By: Matter of R-A-, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 
301, 333 (2001) (stating that women in the United States only report half of 
the violent “incidents inflicted by their intimate partners to the police”). 
 185. See, e.g., Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, para. 5 (Can. F.C.) 
(WL) (holding that the applicant failed to make diligent efforts to seek gov-
ernment protection); Espinosa v. Canada, 2005 CarswellNat 5991, para. 5 
(Can. F.C.) (WL) (holding that the applicant did not meet her burden of prov-
ing the government’s inability to protect her, as she never complained of the 
abuse); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 
95, [4] (Eng.) (placing weight on the fact that the applicant sought police pro-
tection to no avail). 
 186. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 26–27 (placing em-
phasis on the fact that, when given the opportunity, a judge did assist L.R. 
through a custody order in her favor). 
 187. See supra notes 170, 174, 176, 179 and accompanying text. 
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vide the only evidence in some cases.188 Of the factors sug-
gested to accompany the proposed test, the following factors 
recognize the private nature of domestic violence: social, cul-
tural, religious, and economic factors influencing the appli-
cant’s environment; and the structure of the country’s legal sys-
tem.189 By examining the applicant’s environment an asylum 
officer or court can gain an understanding of the severity of the 
persecution and the potential difficulties the applicant may face 
in reporting or gaining access to the legal system. 
The government, in most cases, wields significant power 
compared to an individual abuser. Unfortunately, this does not 
mean that the government is capable of protecting the individ-
ual applicant from her persecutor.190 A domestic violence appli-
cant will most likely need to argue that the government is un-
willing, for cultural or other reasons, to protect her, and the 
individualized reasonable access approach addresses this prob-
lem directly. Country condition information from the state de-
partment or nongovernmental organizations working in the re-
gion may provide some evidence that a government is unwilling 
to address the particular harm, but courts should consider the 
applicant’s individual situation and not rely solely on general 
country information in their assessment of this element.191 Fac-
tors that consider attempts by the applicant to get government 
assistance; police or government response; reluctance or refusal 
to investigate, prosecute, or punish persecutors; status or posi-
tion of the persecutor; country conditions; and official govern-
ment policies all address this power disparity between the gov-
ernment and the applicant’s persecutor.192 Looking at this wide 
array of factors gives asylum officers and courts a sense of the 
government’s actual relationship with the persecutor beyond 
the inference that the sheer size and resources of a government 
should afford it the ability to control an individual persecutor.  
 
 188. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (“The testimony 
of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof 
without corroboration.”). 
 189. See supra notes 176–77and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 2001) (explaining that, 
although R-A- reported to police on multiple occasions, she never received pro-
tection because the police failed to follow through on a summons for her 
husband). 
 191. See id. at 910–11 (examining the poor record of the Guatemalan gov-
ernment regarding spousal-abuse response); Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
357, 362 (B.I.A. 1996) (relying on State Department reports to demonstrate 
Togo’s tolerance for FGM). 
 192. See supra notes 160–62, 175, 178 and accompanying text. 
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If DHS had not stipulated to asylum in In re L.R., the sug-
gested test and factors could have been applied to assist in as-
sessing L.R.’s individual circumstances. As an illustration of 
the application of the proposed test and factors to an actual 
case, the following is a brief discussion of L.R.’s access to gov-
ernment protection; The Mexican government in rural areas 
has a history of tolerating domestic violence and there is a gen-
eral societal acceptance of the practice.193 L.R. reported her 
abuse to police more than once, resulting in inadequate law en-
forcement response and statements from officers that it was a 
private matter.194 This reluctance to investigate or prosecute 
L.R.’s abuser was partially due to his status as a wealthy 
member of their village.195 She did receive assistance through 
the legal system on her third to attempt gain custody of her 
children based on child abuse and received a protective order 
against her abuser, but he was not punished for assaulting and 
threatening her.196 L.R. was a licensed teacher with the poten-
tial to financially support herself, but she was economically 
controlled by her husband.197 These factors may indicate that 
even if the Mexican government as a whole does not tolerate 
domestic abuse, L.R.’s personal experience in her town depicts 
a government unwilling to protect her. A focus on the reasona-
bleness of L.R. obtaining government protection in her individ-
ual situation through examination of the suggested factors al-
lows evidence particular to the applicant’s situation rather 
than general country condition information to control the out-
come. 
Approaching the element of government protection with a 
focus on the individual applicant’s ability to access protection 
allows for consideration of factors specific to that applicant. 
This approach helps to alleviate the significant obstacles in the 
path of asylum for domestic violence victims. 
 
 193. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 15 (noting that “social 
expectations in Mexico do little to disabuse” men of the view that they have a 
right to abuse their female partners); Declaration of L.R., supra note 1, at 9 
(describing how people in L.R.’s village did nothing to help her when she was 
beaten in public). 
 194. Declaration of L.R., supra note 1, at 9. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 14–17. 
 197. Id. at 8, 11, 21. 
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  CONCLUSION   
DHS’s statements in In re L.R. removed the issue of fitting 
domestic violence asylum applicants into a “particular social 
group,” which has been the focus of discussion in this area of 
asylum law for the past twenty years. Courts, practitioners, 
and advocates must now focus on another central element in 
domestic violence asylum cases—proving a government unable 
or unwilling to protect the applicant. DHS can aid this shift in 
focus by including in new rules or guidance a framework for 
analyzing this element. The department should adopt a test in-
quiring as to the applicant’s reasonable access to government 
protection by emphasizing the ten factors discussed above. En-
couraging an applicant-centered approach to the element of 
governmental protection is reasonable where an applicant has 
the opportunity to obtain and present a variety of evidence. 
Any forthcoming rules from DHS should focus on the govern-
mental protection element of asylum as it relates to domestic 
violence applicants. 
